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ABSTRACT 
Emergency medical triage is a necessary part of our healthcare world. The ability to sort, 
classify, and treat patients in a crisis is a skill that few perfect. In a disaster situation or mass 
casualty incident, the number of injured people can often overwhelm the ability of the local 
healthcare system to treat them. To help create efficient use and rationing of resources, emergency 
personnel use triage to assess, sort, and treat patients. Questions of public health importance 
immediately arise when discussing the implications of sorting patients based on their injuries in a 
crisis, and the triage system was created to answer these inquires. From the ideas of Napoleon’s 
Chief surgeon in the Imperial guard, triage has developed and changed immensely over the years. 
In this paper, I will analyze the historical development of emergency triage, analyze two major 
systems (START and SALT) used today in the U.S., discuss the problems and challenges of 
studying triage, analyze the literature surrounding the training of triage, and discuss the ethical 
implications associated with performing triage. Although triage algorithms alone are simple 
decision trees, the implications that accompany it create a multitude of problems for emergency 
personnel and those being treated. With this analysis, I will provide the evidence available on the 
systems and recommendations for the future of triage.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Emergency medical triage is the process of sorting patients in a predefined way to address 
resource allocation concerns. In itself, triage is a tricky process with many questions associated 
with it that have yet to be answered. Even still, some of those questions create more questions than 
actual answers. In this paper, I intend: to analyze the history of triage, to examine how it has 
developed and changed for today’s society, to conduct an analysis on the systems’ effectiveness 
based on the current literature, to discuss the ethical implications associated with performing 
triage, and to recommend ideas for the future.  
The ability to sort patients during a chaotic and uncertain time is an expertise not everyone 
can possess and multiple trainings need to be performed to perfect the skillset required for these 
situations. When training, it is important to recognize the difficulty of reproducing the chaotic 
atmosphere of an emergency, along with the uncertainty of triage patients during these events. In 
an emergency situation, the duties and responsibilities of triaging patients usually falls on “triage 
officers.” The profession of this officer usually depends on the emergency at hand. If the patients 
are arriving in the hospital’s emergency department, a nurse is typically assigned to the triage role. 
On the battlefield, the role is often fulfilled by the military physicians receiving the wounded 
soldiers. In disaster situations, where the number of patients far exceeds the abilities of the first 
responders arriving on scene, the triage officer role falls to those first responders that arrive on the 
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scene first; or, if they are not trained in the triage skillset, the role will fall to the first arriving 
person who is trained for triaging patients (Beach, 2010).  
Whomever fulfills the triage officer role, must face the difficult question of which patients 
to treat first. Should the seriously wounded individuals receive more care to save their lives and 
restrict resources for later patients? Or should “the many” be treated with the fewest resources, 
and the seriously wounded treated last with whatever remains? Although many daunting questions 
surround emergency triage protocols, this paper will address how should triage be used for future 
incidents, what considerations need to be taken into account when performing triage, and what is 
the best method of preparation for when these events occur?  
PUBLIC HEALTH RELEVANCE 
Triage is a necessary part of healthcare, as it provides a system and process to deal with 
situations where the number of patients needing treatment exceeds the capacity of the healthcare 
system attempting to help them. It is important to understand the tools available to our society to 
aid in our response to crisis situations. Understanding the system, along with its implications, 
allows for better decision making when patients are being triaged. At the same time, by analyzing 
the triage system, the goal is to encourage discussion and further research into the subject to not 
only improve effectiveness but to also increase awareness of the triage processes and its outcomes.  
In this paper, I approach one of the most difficult decision-making procedures in a scientific scope 





1.1 WHAT IS TRIAGE 
The following historical analysis is mostly based on an excellent review by Iserson and 
Moskop (2007). When providing care to patients in need, multiple terms are used throughout the 
healthcare world: allocation, rationing, and triage are just a few examples. Allocation encompasses 
the largest scope, as it describes the distribution of both medical and non-medical resources. 
Allocation also does not necessarily imply that any of those resources are scarce. Rationing begins 
to include the scarcity of resources with the implication is that not all the needs of patient(s) can 
be satisfied at the time. This term also applies to more than just the healthcare system, as food, 
water, and supply rations have been in existence since beyond human memory (Iserson & Moskop, 
2007). Triage, in all implications, specifically applies to the limited resources of healthcare and 
the situation causing those limitations. Triage typically satisfies the following three conditions: 
1)  Modest scarcity of healthcare resources exists in some capacity; varying widely 
depending on the location and type of situation at hand. 
2) A health care worker often becomes a designated “triage officer” who assess each 
patient’s needs, and distinguishes the future decisions for treatment of that patient. 
3) The triage officer typically utilizes a pre-established plan to classify patients, based 
on an agreed-upon algorithm or criteria set. (Iserson & Moskop, 2007) 
Thus, triage becomes necessary when healthcare resources are scarce (not sufficient to treat 
the patients’ needs). To solve this problem, a healthcare worker must examine, categorize, and 
classify patients following a pre-established plan to ensure that the available resources are utilized 
in the most effective way possible. These plans were used, tested, and amended throughout history, 
potentially dating back hundreds of years. In the next section, I will analyze the historical 
development of the triage protocols.  
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1.2 HISTORY OF TRIAGE 
The beginnings of triage arose from the reality of war, and the development of military 
medicine to help treat the wounded soldiers from the field. No formal record or history exists of 
Ancient or medieval armies organizing a concerted effort to treat their soldiers, and their care was 
likely to be ineffective. The first officially recorded triage situations developed in the 18th century 
with the work of French military surgeon Baron Dominique-Jean Larrey, chief-surgeon of 
Napoleon’s Imperial Guard (Iserson & Moskop, 2007).  
Triage is derived from the French word trier, to sort, and was originally used to describe 
the sorting of agricultural products. Larrey adapted the use of the word when he recognized the 
need to evaluate and classify wounded soldiers for treatment during a battle. In his time, it was 
customary to wait until after the battle had concluded (sometimes hours, even days) before tending 
to the wounded, leaving many soldiers to die. To help resolve this issue, he developed “flying 
ambulances:” horse drawn carts with storage area, to rapidly remove the wounded from the raging 
battles. Larrey was also the first to develop the idea that many triage officials still hold true today:  
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“Those who are dangerously wounded should receive the first 
attention, without regard to rank or distinction. They who are injured in a less 
degree may wait until their brethren in arms, who are badly mutilated, have 
been operated on and dress, otherwise the latter would not survive many 
hours; rarely, until the succeeding day.” (Iserson & Moskop, Triage in 
Medicine, Part I: Concept, History and Types, 2007) 
 
  
The next major contribution to military triage was developed in 1846 when British naval 
surgeon John Wilson stated that, to make their effort the most effective, surgeons should focus on 
those patients who need immediate attention and for whom treatment is likely to be successful, 
deferring treatment for those who wounds are less severe and those whose wounds are probably 
fatal with or without immediate care. This was in concurrence with Larrey’s already established 
practices, but was significant because of his official statement on the subject. In contrast, the US 
military services did not officially begin triaging soldiers until much later. In 1862, Jonathan 
Letterman became the first medic who combined triage procedures with front-line medical care 
and ambulatory services, allowing things to start looking up for wounded US soldiers (Iserson & 
Moskop, 2007).  
As time moved forward, medical professionals were forced to adapt and refine triage 
protocols to fit the needs of advancing technologies in warfare. World War I brought the inventions 
and use of deadly new weapons into the world, such as machine guns and poison gases, that created 
an unprecedented number of casualties requiring triage. However, the ethics and thought processes 
behind this triage differed from that of Larrey and Letterman, focusing more on treating those that 
would require the least amount of time and effort to replenish battlefield numbers before moving 
to the more intensive patients, as “the greatest good of the greatest number must be the rule,” 
(Iserson & Moskop, 2007). World War II continued this ideology, and had US military physicians 
pushing to get the greatest number of troops back onto the field in the shortest time possible, 
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instead of treating the most demanding war wounds. This promoted the least expenditure of 
resources and the maximizing of the fighting strength for the participating armies, but left the more 
severely injured soldiers out to dry. 
 In today’s military world, the scarcity of medical resources is not typically a limiting factor 
in treatment. Due to the increased speed of extraction of wounded soldiers via helicopters and 
other modern technologies, large numbers of wounded combatants can be quickly evacuated from 
the field of battle, and transported to medical facilities located close to the front lines with high-
level equipment on site. Only primarily guerilla and developing world armies lack the resources 
to treat severely injured combatants quickly, and must take this scarcity into account.  
 Per Iserson and Moskop’s review (2007), there has been little written discussion on the 
history of triage in civilian contexts. Weinerman et al (1966) was one of the first to publish a 
systematic description of civilian Emergency Department’s use of triage in 1964, but was unable 
to show documented triage usage in a civilian context before the 19th century. Auf der Heide (1989) 
later stated that although triage systems existed in the world and have been used for centuries, most 
disaster casualties, at the time, did not undergo out-of-hospital triage because victims are found 
and transported directly to the hospital by bystanders. Since that time, almost all emergency 
medical systems, local, state and federal governments, and private institutions have developed 
triage systems to be used in disaster situations. 
1.3 TYPES OF TRIAGE 
Multiple triage types exist throughout the modern healthcare delivery system. The most 
common areas where triage is used includes, but is not limited to: the emergency department, 
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inpatient intensive care units, multi-casualty incidents, military battlefield situations, and disasters 
(mass casualties). Even though all areas have distinctive elements of triage that makes them 
unique, each exhibit the three conditions – existence of scarcity, presence of a triage officer, and 
use of a triage protocol – listed earlier by Iserson and Moskop (2007). The systems discussed in 
the upcoming sections are not an exhaustive list of all the triage systems available to emergency 
services personnel. They are only the systems I have chosen to discuss and analyze in this paper.  
Emergency Department Triage (ED) 
In most modern U.S. hospitals with emergency departments (EDs), the nurse triage officers 
constantly assess and classify all patients who arrive for treatment. Their goal is to identify the 
most urgent and in-need patients to ensure that they receive care before more adverse effects can 
occur (such as death or loss of extremities). After those patients are admitted for treatment, the less 
urgent patients are typically addressed on a first-come-first-serve basis. In most emergency 
departments, there are usually enough resources to treat every patient that arrives, just not at the 
same time. With the limitations on bed space, medical staff, or other factors, triage becomes 
necessary to determine who needs treatment immediately versus those who can wait the extra time 
(Iserson & Moskop, 2007). 
Routinely, U.S. emergency departments have used a 3-level system to sort and classify 
patients. The three levels include: “most immediate,” “can be delayed,” and “does not need 
emergency care.” The nurse assesses the patient’s reason for entering the ED and vital signs, then 
decides from there. However, a new system called the Emergency Severity Index (ESI) is making 
its way into hospitals. This is a 5-level classification system that uses four pre-determined 
“decision points” to establish which level a patient should be triaged. Those decision points are 
then examined and applied to an algorithm that places the patients in the correct category for 
  8 
treatment. The levels promulgated by ESI range from 1-5, with one being the most severe and in 
need of immediate treatment and decreasing from there. (Agency for Helathcare Research and 
Quality, 2014). The decision analysis algorithm is shown below in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. ESI Triage Algorithm for U.S. Hospitals 
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ICU Triage 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) triage, like ED triage, helps determine and separate those 
patients who require treatment immediately, from those who can wait for a time. Ideally, hospitals 
strive to be able to serve and care for all patients being admitted into the ICU. However, this is 
often not the case and forces critical decisions to be made. These decisions are classified as triage 
decisions, and the triage officer is most often a nurse, but can sometimes be an attending physician 
if the nurse is not available or unsure about a specific patient. To help streamline the process, the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (2014) proposed using an adapted form of 
the ESI for ICU’s to help alleviate the stress of decision making. However, the specific algorithm 
of this modified triage was not published by the ARHQ and is cannot be shown in this paper. I 
assume that the decision tree on the algorithm would be similar to the previously shown Figure 1, 
as the triage officer would have to make similar evaluations of the patients requiring treatments.  
Military Battlefield Triage 
As previously noted, triage began with military battlefield personnel and wounded soldiers. 
With this comes a major difference between military triage and the typical civilian triage systems: 
the command structure shared among the military triage officers. Employed health care 
professionals in the military can have an obligation to follow their superior officers’ orders, 
potentially affecting the way healthcare and/or scarce resources are used in certain situations. For 
example, an assassination mission by special forces may designate who will be treated for injuries 
first, i.e. military members and civilians injured by the specific action of the personnel, then 
civilians and others not involved with the operation. (Iserson & Moskop, 2007). Typical military 
triage systems follow the aforementioned ability to extract all wounded soldiers quickly and 
efficiently to medical facilities. Military physicians then triage the patients and determine which 
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ones should be treated and with what resources. This decision tree is not specifically published in 
any literature, but I am assuming that these triage officers treat the most severely wounded soldiers 
first, then the less severely wounded. After the soldiers are treated, the civilians wounded by the 
tactical operations are treated, followed by those who were not involved in the military operations.  
Mass Casualty Incidents and Disaster Triage 
A mass casualty incident is defined as an emergency that involves 4 or more victims that 
are injured. A disaster, by definition is a natural or man-made event that overwhelms all available 
resources for a given area or community to meet the needs of a specific incident (Beach, 2010). 
The difference between disaster triage and incident triage can vary, but is mostly defined by the 
magnitude of the destruction and if the health care system of the area is overwhelmed. In a multi-
vehicle accident, the available resources in a rural area (1-2 ambulances) may cause incident triage, 
but does not overwhelm the hospital’s resources that the patients are being transferred to and 
treated. Therefore, in a disaster that overwhelms all available resources, triage becomes essential 
to determine which patients need to be allocated resources and which must wait until more are 
available. (Beach, 2010). 
There are multiple ways that triage occurs during disasters. The World Medical Association 
has developed a system that has been adopted by countries around the world and includes the 
following criteria: 
1) Those who can be saved but whose lives are in immediate danger, require treatment 
immediately. 
2) Those whose lives are not in immediate danger, but will need urgent care, just not 
immediately. 
3) Those requiring only minor treatment at the time of triage 
4) Those who are psychologically traumatized who might need reassurance or sedation. 
5) Those whose lives are beyond the available resources, and whose injuries cannot be 
treated in the immediate circumstances (Kennedy, Aghababian, Gans, & Lewis, 1996) 
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In the United States, however, there are varying systems being used by emergency response 
personnel. The first among many, is called START, or Simple Triage And Rapid Treatment. This 
system was developed by Huag Hospital and the Newport Beach Fire Department. Its purpose is 
to allow the personnel with limited time, resources, and medical knowledge to be able to sort and 
distinguish patient classifications for patients within 60 seconds or less.  Four criteria are used to 
help determine patient classification: can the patients respond and walk, how fast are the patients 
breathing, what are the patient’s perfusion stats, and what is the patient’s mental status (Beach, 
2010). Figure 2 shows the exact algorithm used in the decision-making process (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2014).  
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Figure 2. START Adult Triage Decision Algorithm 
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Another widely used triage system within the U.S. is called JumpSTART. Developed by 
Dr. Lou E. Romig in 1995, JumpSTART was her way to address the concerns of applying the 
triage process to pediatric physiology (Team Life Support Inc., 2012). Before the creation of 
JumpSTART, there was no objective mass casualty triage tool available for use that included 
pediatric measures. Team Life Support Inc. now disseminates trainings and consultations based 
around the START/JumpSTART combined triage algorithm, which is shown in Figure 3. The 
main difference between START and JumpSTART is the option to include 5 rescue breaths to 
determine if the child’s airway can be activated again if not working.   
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Figure 3. Combined START/JumpSTART Decision-Making Algorithm 
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There are many additional systems available to triage officers, beyond ESI, START, and 
JumpSTART within the U.S. that are not be discussed in this essay.  
Because of variation in protocols, problems arise when minute differences in triage 
procedures cause certain patients to be classified differently, depending on which algorithm the 
triage officer is utilizing. In an attempt to standardize the triage protocols and merge the multiple 
varying systems, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) gathered a working group and created the 
SALT triage protocol (Sort, Assess, Life-saving interventions, Treatment/Transport) (Federal 
Interagency Committee on EMS, 2014). SALT is based on a set of guidelines called the Model 
Uniformed Core Criteria (MUCC) that were determined as the “most important” sets of guidelines 
that a triage system must contain. One major difference between SALT and the previously 
mentioned systems, is that life-saving interventions are not usually applied until after the triage 
classification had occurred, whereas, with SALT, life-saving interventions are applied before the 
sorting of the patient is done (Federal Interagency Committee on EMS, 2014). The decision-
making algorithm used in SALT can be seen in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4. SALT Triage Algorithm 
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With the varying forms of triage comes the potential for confusing and dangerous situations 
when disasters and other crisis situations occur. The danger is created when emergency personnel 
become confused on the protocols of triage during a crisis situation, delaying treatment and 
potentially causing the loss of life for the critically injured. Now that the historical development 
and triage systems have been introduced, I am going to move to the in-depth analysis of the 
presented systems, evidence supporting them, and how we can use this evidence to create a system 
of uniformity throughout the U.S. 
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2.0  REVIEW OF TRIAGE SYSTEMS 
When it comes to triage decision making, officers, nurses, EMTs and other personnel must 
have a general understanding of what event has occurred to cause the injuries, who they are 
treating, and the necessary actions that will help save the lives of those in need. This requires 
preparation, planning, practice, and an organizational approach that accounts for the scarcity of 
available resources, and implements them in the most effective way to resolve the mass as quickly 
as possible. Depending on the decisions being made, some patients may only receive palliative 
care as they pass away, while other get sent home with minor injuries (Kennedy, Aghababian, 
Gans, & Lewis, 1996).  
In this section, the triage systems are compared on multiple levels, and studies are reviewed 
to help determine which process and decision making analysis can become the gold-standard for 
the future mass casualty events. The available research, studies and evidence-based analysis 
relating to the triage systems are severely limited. As a result, of the 200 articles reviewed, fewer 
than 10 articles included evidence based studies that analyzed the triage systems in question. In 
addition to the analyses, I will present the challenges to studying such systems as a potential cause 
for the lack of literature available on the subject. 
The first step is to inquire whether the frequently used START system has certifiable data 
to back it up its usage. In a study done by Garner et al. (2001), they retrospectively measured the 
accuracy of multiple mass casualty triage algorithms when it came to predicting critical injuries in 
adult patients. Garner’s review was completed in Australia, and includes triage systems that are 
not used in the U.S.: CareFlight and modified START. CareFlight differs from the usual START 
triage system because it does not include a respiratory rate assessment, and the level of 
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consciousness is assessed first. Modified START substitutes palpability of radial pulse for 
capillary refill for perfusion status (Garner, Lee, Harrison, & Schultz, 2001). Although CareFlight, 
and modified START are the triage systems not used in the U.S., the review was included because 
it also analyzed JumpSTART and START. 
Their review consisted of 1,144 consecutive patients admitted to 2 different trauma centers 
by ambulance transportation. The patients were divided into groups based on the triage system 
they were classified by, and then it was determined whether the triage classification was correct. 
The results: START had an 85% sensitivity (how often a true classification was done correctly) 
and an 86% specificity (how accurate the classifications were described) of predicting critical 
injuries within adult patients. None of the other triage systems reviewed (CareFlight, JumpSTART, 
and modified START) had any statistically significant sensitivity than the others; however, the 
CareFlight Triage system had statistically significant specificity than the other systems that have 
been reviewed (Garner, Lee, Harrison, & Schultz, 2001). It is important that START triage had a 
lower specificity than Australia’s CareFlight system. This supports an interesting point that the 
U.S. triage systems may be less effective than systems that other countries are currently using.  
The limitation with studies like this one, is that they are not specifically looking at a disaster 
or specific mass casualty event where one of these triage systems were put in place. Thus, their 
results can be said to be minor, at best, at reviewing the effectiveness of START for mass casualty 
and disaster situations. Yet, START seems to be fairly effective at identifying critical injuries and 
sorting these patients into the correct triage categories.  
 Similarly, Gebhart et al. (2007) reviewed trauma patients and attempted to classify them 
based on the START algorithm. Then, whenever they left the hospital, either by death or discharge, 
the ability of the algorithm to correctly predict their treatment and outcome was analyzed. Overall, 
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75.77% of the time, START correctly predicted the “survivability” of the person’s injuries within 
the trauma center (Gebhart & Pence, 2007). Like Garner’s review, this study focuses on people 
that were already admitted, or on their way, to the hospital and attempted to identify and include 
them into the START triage system without an actual mass casualty event occurring. It is still 
significant to note that the START accuracy, according to both studies, was higher than 75% in 
correctly classifying the patients. With both studies combined retrospective efforts, it would seem 
that START is well designed and accomplishes the goal of identifying those that can be saved with 
available resources and those who cannot. The question of whether 75% or greater accuracy is 
enough, will be addressed later in the paper. 
When used in an actual disaster, instead of patients who are already admitted to the 
hospital, the START triage system has different ratings, creating a question of its efficacy of 
correctly sorting and classifying wounded patients. Kahn et al. (2009) analyzed the use of START 
with an actual train crash disaster in 2003. They reviewed medical records at hospitals and 
identified the patient’s START triage classification upon entering the hospital, and the result of 
their treatment (discharge, death, etc.). After reviewing almost 150 patients from 14 receiving 
hospitals from the incident the found that START accurately and correctly classified the patient’s 
injuries 44.6% of the time. The reason for such a low accuracy was claimed to be overtriage  (Kahn, 
Schultz, Miller, & Anderson, 2009). Overtriage is the term used when a patient is classified into a 
higher category, with injuries that are suited for a lower classification. For example, a patient can 
be categorized as red tag/immediate, when their actual injuries suggest that they should be 
classified as a yellow tag/delayed. Along similar lines, a concept called undertriage is just the 
opposite. This is when a patient’s injuries are classified lower than they should be. For example, a 
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patient who should be classified red/immediate is triaged into the yellow/delayed. Both terms will 
be discussed more in detail later in the paper. 
In their review, overtriage occurred 81% of the time, causing START accuracy to drop 
significantly (Kahn, Schultz, Miller, & Anderson, 2009). When this study is analyzed holistically, 
there are some limitations. Most notably, the methodology was unable to discern whether errors 
in the START classification was a result of the algorithm being difficult/confusing, or whether the 
failure rests with the emergency personnel’s choice to apply it correctly. The authors claim that 
the most likely cause of the low START accuracy was due to “overtriage bias,” or the tendency of 
personnel workers to desire to treat and save as many as possible, regardless of the available 
resources. The reluctance to triage someone into a lower classification can cause strains on the 
healthcare system, and significantly impact the accuracy of the START triage system results. 
(Kahn, Schultz, Miller, & Anderson, 2009). I will discuss overtriage bias more in-depth during 
section 3.1. 
Another retrospective disaster analysis of START reviewed the maldistribution of patients 
after a train crash in Los Angeles in 2005 (Zoraster, Chidester, & Koenig, 2006). This study 
analyzed the effectiveness of the communication between the field-triage staff and the 
transportation accuracy of those patients labeled “Immediate” (red tag) to the various hospitals in 
the surrounding communities. Their results showed that 26 of the total 114 patients labeled 
“Immediate” were transported to community hospitals that were >15 miles from the crash site, 
while multiple hospitals with established trauma centers (not community hospitals) did not receive 
any patients (Zoraster, Chidester, & Koenig, 2006). Overall, this study does not support the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of START triage. I included it in this analysis because it explores 
another problem associated with triage. If the system is in place, how do first responders and 
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emergency personnel coordinate themselves and the surrounding community to effectively and 
efficiently triage, transport and treat patients in a mass casualty incident such as this? If the 
classification system that is implemented is perfect, but nobody is effective in implementing it then 
the system becomes completely useless. To help prevent problems like this, trainings on how to 
use the triage systems need to be coordinated with communication plans with the community and 
local healthcare providers. This creates an organizational plan that will prevent instances that were 
reviewed by Zoraster et al. (2006). A more inclusive discussion of training systems is included in 
the following section.  
2.1 CHALLENGES OF STUDYING TRIAGE SYSTEMS 
As previously mentioned, the number of analytical studies on triage systems within the 
literature are extremely limited. There are multiple reasons for this occurrence:  
1. Studying effectiveness of triage systems becomes difficult when few actual disasters have 
occurred in recent history to study. During these events, it is difficult to control for the 
multiple variables and factors that would need to be examined in a typical, randomized, 
scientific analysis.  
2. If the mass casualty event does occur, and it is not analyzed during the event, it can be 
especially difficult to retrospectively analyze the available data. The inherent chaos 
surrounding the event lends itself to difficult data collection. The only way to solve this 
would be to produce conscientious minds that are willing and able to record and track all 
types of data in the middle of the event; then to return and analyze the collected 
information afterwards. 
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3. Simulations of mass casualty events can be difficult to recreate. Immersing one into the 
chaos and reality of triage is a tricky aspect of studying the effectiveness of triage, and 
those “in the moment” decisions can change from training to an actual situation.  
With these challenges in mind, it becomes clear why analytical studies and literature reviews 
on the triage systems of the U.S. are few and far between. It also helps to explain why there are so 
many varying triage systems used by emergency personnel. There is no “gold standard” to 
streamline the entire process because there is not enough evidence to support it one way or another. 
However, with a standard triage system, comes the ability to communicate and theoretically sort 
all patients during a crisis using the same algorithm. With this, personnel from multiple 
jurisdictions can come together and perform the triage officer roles without miscommunication of 
triage classifications. In the next section, I combine the evidence of available literature reviews in 
an attempt to recommend which system should be considered the “standard practice” for U.S. 
triage protocols. 
2.2 CALLING FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD 
To help solve some of the previously mentioned complications, multiple literature reviews 
were completed to attempt to establish the most efficient way to manage resources and show the 
best triage approach, with the evidence base supporting it, to create a national standard for 
emergency triage personnel. A review done by Cully and Svendsen (2014), showed that in the 
literature from 1970-2000, 42 articles met their inclusion criteria, and only 19 addressed the 
validity of the triage systems. From there, only 4 articles used real mass casualty outcome data to 
describe or analyze the efficacy of the triage systems that were employed throughout the event. 
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The remaining 15 used simulation data, literature searches, or consensus groups to describe the 
efficacy of various triage systems used here in the U.S. (Culley & Svendsen, 2014). Their 
conclusion was that even with the comprehensive literature search, it was impossible to review the 
effectiveness of triage systems, and more evidence would need to be gathered and obtained during 
mass casualty events. 
Another literature review, conducted by Timbie et al. (2013), reviewed over 5,500 potentially 
relevant publications to attempt to find the most efficient way to manage and allocate limited 
resources during mass casualty incidents. Of those reviewed, only 74 studies met the inclusion 
criteria. Only 25 of those studies reviewed mass casualty events. Thirteen of those 25 examined 
triage performance during incidents. However, only 6 publications reviewed results from events 
that occurred; the other 7 were from simulated events. Each of the triage studies focused on 
different aspects of systems, or different systems entirely, many focusing only on the efficacy of 
one system with little to no comparative analyses done (Timbie, et al., 2013). Again, this 
comprehensive literature review was unable to produce significant data to show which triage 
systems, if any, were considered “effective,” and more research would need to be completed.  
The call for more evidence was further echoed with a literature review done by Jenkins et al. 
(2008). In their report, several triage systems have been developed, both here in the U.S., and 
worldwide, but there is no standardized way to research these systems, nor is there significant 
evidence to suggest which of the many systems should be utilized on a regular basis. With these 
types of results, it becomes difficult to understand and know which protocol any first responder 
should be learning; thus, contributing to the chaos during the actual event (Jenkins, et al., 2008).  
Jenkins, Timbie, and Cully/Svendsen all support the idea of having more evidence based research 
on the triage systems. With such limited data, and only three literature reviews found that discuss 
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the evidence on triage here in the U.S., it is no surprise why the CDC worked to convene a work 
group that would not only gather evidence on the triage systems, but create a new standard that 
could be implemented throughout the country.  In this next section, I intend to analyze SALT and 
its evidence base as the proposed national guidelines for triage. 
2.3 CREATING A NATIONAL STANDARD 
In response to the calls for more evidence and research, the CDC funded a grant through 
the National Association of EMS Physicians in 2006 to convene a workgroup and develop a 
national standard of triage systems. They began by creating 24 criteria that they believed all triage 
systems should include and utilize (MUCC). Taking these newly created criteria, work began on 
developing a new triage classification system. SALT, introduced earlier in the paper, was the 
eventual creation of the workgroup (Federal Interagency Committee on EMS, 2014). 
Once the standardized triage system was developed, the real issue became clear: getting 
states and local organizations to adopt and utilize it consistently. By the time SALT was created, 
34 states had developed EMS specific mass casualty protocols at the local levels. In addition, 18 
of those states developed and implemented statewide standard protocols of care for EMS response 
to mass casualty incidents. All 34 of the states who have their own systems reported using START 
or JumpSTART as the most commonly triage system for these incidents (Federal Interagency 
Committee on EMS, 2014). The challenge faced by proponents of SALT was to gather enough 
evidence and support to show that it was more effective that START, and needed to be 
implemented as the nationwide standard; however, this proved more difficult than previously 
anticipated.  
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Not long after the introduction of SALT and the MUCC, scientists and other critics began 
to analyze the new triage system, hoping to find sufficient evidence to either support its use, or 
disprove the MUCC and SALT. Lerner et al. (2011) were one of the first to attempt this course of 
study. In their report, they analyzed every criterion of the MUCC in depth, its origin, and how 
these could be used to either improve the existing triage systems or continue to improve the brand-
new SALT triage system. What they found was unsurprising to many, as there was not enough 
current evidence to support the use of SALT as a replacement for START or any other previously 
implemented system (Lerner, et al., 2011). However, in their review of the literature, they found 
one study that compared both SALT and START using virtual reality simulations of disaster 
situations. The results showed that the START system was more accurate, faster, and gave better 
results that SALT. However, the main limitation to this study is that with any type of simulations, 
the experiment designers develop the correct answers to triaging patients, and the simulation is 
designed around the triage systems being tested. This includes having the patient’s injuries fit the 
predefined categories of the triage system, and there being one correct answer for each patient. In 
a real situation, there is no direct answer, and the injured patients are not divided into specific 
predefined categories (Lerner, et al., 2011). With this limitation, although useful evidence was 
provided, the experiment showed simulation support data, but cannot be correlated to an actual 
disaster situation. 
The only other comparative analysis between SALT and START (or SALT and any other 
triage system) was done in 2014 by Jones et al. Using a simulated mass casualty event, paramedics 
were randomly assigned to use either SALT or JumpSTART (considering the experiment was 
using pediatric patients). Before the exercise, the individual groups were given “just-in-time” 
training to refresh their skills and knowledge on the task they were about to perform. They were 
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then set to triage simulated pediatric patients in an emergency situation. Jones et al. analyzed a few 
different aspects of each system: overall triage accuracy, overtriage, undertriage, and time to triage 
per patient. For SALT, the overall triage accuracy, overtriage rate, and undertriage rates were 66%, 
22%, and 10% respectively. For JumpSTART, the rates were concluded to be 66%, 23%, and 
11.2% for overall, overtriage, and undertriage respectively. Time to triage per patient was 
statistically faster in the JumpSTART group (26 seconds), versus the SALT group (34 seconds) 
(Jones, et al., 2014). Overall, their results showed no overall statistically significant difference 
between SALT and START when it came to overall accuracy, undertriage, or overtriage. However, 
JumpSTART did allow the paramedics to be faster in their decision-making analysis with the 
patients than the SALT group. 
Because of the limited amount of data on triage systems, there are no standard rates for 
accuracy, overtriage, or undertriage in the literature, so national comparative analysis was unable 
to be done for this study. It was also noted that cognitive errors were common in both groups, and 
more than one participant in the study reported using the “gut instincts” to decide on triage 
decisions instead of referring to the algorithm given to them in their trainings. Limitations for this 
study ranged from small sample size, misinterpreted features of the simulations. Thus, the results 
should not be used as national standard guidelines, and should only be used as “contributing data 
to the growing research pool” (Jones, et al., 2014).  
With the SALT system being so new, it is clear that once again there is not enough evidence 
and/or experiments completed to show significant difference between it and the existing systems. 
As a result, more analyses will need to be completed before I feel that SALT will be able to be 
implemented and adopted as the “nation standard for triage systems” that its creation was meant 
to be. 
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2.4 ANALYSIS OF TRAINING TRIAGE 
It is one thing to understand the challenges that come from studying the triage systems, and 
another to address the problems that arise in the learning and training of the triage protocols. 
Nobody becomes an expert in triage overnight, and no emergency personnel would walk in to a 
situation and expect to know all the information needed to perform triage effectively. Learning 
and training is essential to help create these experts for when the situation does occur. In this 
section, I am going to review the limited data on training triage to emergency personnel and how 
we can adapt it with modern technology to not only increase effectiveness, but the efficacy of the 
training, as well.  
The main way people have been training for these types of incidents is through simulated 
training scenarios. Usually, volunteers and personnel will be placed in a fake scenario and must 
respond per the trainings they have been given. Many times, this includes triaging patients with 
wounds represented by makeup, forcing the emergency personnel to decide how to classify them 
based on their injuries. Afterwards, the results will then be collected and analyzed to help 
determine if the emergency personnel responded in the best way possible. The data will also be 
studied and used to improve future exercises in the future, along with the emergency response 
system (including triage) can be improved from the results.  
However, problems are immediately clear with these types of scenarios. The ability to do 
scenario practice solely relies on the amount of time, money, personnel, and open availability that 
a group has within their reach. If they are short staffed, underfunded, cannot access enough 
volunteers, or have no subject matter experts to coordinate the scenarios, then these trainings often 
do not occur. Obviously without trainings and real practice for emergency personnel, there is no 
way to develop and refine the skills needed to respond adequately to an emergency. The second 
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problem arises with how “real” these situations actually are, and how well can they be applied 
back into the real-world scenarios of mass casualty incidents. With the technology of manikins 
and other more “real aspects” being developed with today’s technological advances, trainings are 
becoming more realistic by the day. Yet, the question remains: is it even possible to replicate the 
chaos and uncertainty of a mass casualty incident? In a training exercise, it is usually 
predetermined injuries and other aspects that are highly controlled to create “good science.” But it 
might be more useful to create a more chaotic situation within the training exercise (without putting 
the trainees at risk) to help simulate a more real scenario.  
One way that the issues of training are being solved is through the virtual reality scene. As 
technology advances, virtual reality is becoming more commercially available, and training 
exercises are being developed in a more “real” way, by completely immersing the trainees into the 
world of a virtual mass casualty event. With the right equipment, the actual chaos and uncertainty 
can be recreated in a more realistic fashion than just working with manikins (or volunteers) lying 
around in a grass field. After reviewing the literature, only one study was found comparing the 
benefits of virtual reality to standard practice drills. In the experiment, participants were placed in 
similar scenarios, one group being immersed in virtual reality, the other in a standard drill setting. 
In the results, the virtual reality group scored a little higher than the standard group on overall 
triage accuracy and response time. However, during a posttest to determine if the training 
improved skill levels, the standard group reported a higher increase in skill levels than virtual 
reality (Andreatta, et al., 2010).  
This study creates some interesting points to be considered when examining the two 
different types of trainings mentioned. The flexibility of virtual reality seemed to put it above the 
standard drill, in terms of practice and ability to adapt the situation to fit the scenario. Standard 
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scenarios are limited by the participants, resources available, and even sometimes the weather. 
With virtual reality, the experiment can be crafted, adjusted, utilized, then adjusted some more to 
create the perfect training scenario. The overall results suggest that virtual reality can provide a 
similar learning outcome as compared to those who participate in standard drills; yet with the 
flexibility of virtual reality, the on-demand training options, and repeatable platform, it seems that 
virtual reality could be “the future of training platforms for these mass casualty incidents” 
(Andreatta, et al., 2010). That being said, the study showed that the virtual reality fell short of 
creating a long-lasting skill set with the emergency personnel who participated. Having the trainees 
perform the scenario in a real-life situation, instead of playing a video game, they tend to learn and 
keep a more flexible skill set with them as they move forward. In addition, as mentioned before 
with the Jones study, some personnel relate back to their “gut-instinct” instead of following the 
actual algorithm that has been set in place. These instincts could be developed and nurtured through 
both types of trainings, but it remains to be seen whether more evidence will be created to help 
solidify the future of emergency triage training. 
2.5 CONCLUSION FROM TRIAGE ANALYSIS 
The most prevalent issue with the triage analysis is that there is extremely limited data found 
on the subject. From comparing the triage systems, themselves, to trainings, the challenges are 
preventing researchers from conducting experiments surrounding this topic. Until there is a more 
solid evidence base to support future steps for the development of triage, I suggest for emergency 
personnel to continue working and training in whatever capacity they have available to them. 
The only way to create people who know and understand how to triage patients is to create those 
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gut instincts in people that have been mentioned earlier. By practicing the skills necessary, and 
working with the triage system that is being utilized by the organization, first responders can 
better prepare themselves for whatever chaos might come with a mass casualty event in their 
area. At the same time, I also recommend studying the triage systems in place (SALT, START, 
etc.) to help learn and understand which algorithm would best fit the goal of the group. If the 
organization is small and cannot support providing life-saving treatment on the scene of a 
disaster, then it would be prudent to practice START triage. At the same time, if life-saving 
treatment can be applied at the scene, and the trainees are willing to learn the SALT system, it 
might be worth trying. Regardless of what system is used, the importance of practicing the 
system and knowing how to perform triage remains. 
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3.0  ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF TRIAGE 
With the responsibility of triage comes the impending question: whether to treat the few, 
or the many? Triage is a controversial topic in many aspects because of this question, and how 
responsibility is placed on one person to determine who should be treated and who should not. In 
this section, I will address the many aspects of this question, along with the implications from 
these many parts. It is important to mention the aspects of triage that are not always in the public’s 
eye: overtriage, undertriage, and the ethical considerations of the entire process. Overtriage is 
when a victim is classified in a more severe triage category than what they should be identified 
with. Undertriage is just the opposite, classifying victims in a lower triage category than they 
should be placed (Beach, 2010). Ethical considerations include those focusing around the ethical 
principles of autonomy, distributive justice and fairness, the prospect of creating the greatest 
utility, and the creation of unequal outcomes within a mass casualty situation. In the following 
section, each topic will be discussed and its effect on the triage process analyzed.  
3.1 OVERTRIAGE 
In Beach’s book, Disaster Preparedness and Management, (2010) he states that rates of 
50% or under of overtriage have been acceptable in the field. This means that half of all the people 
injured in a mass casualty incident could be classified in the wrong category. When I discussed 
studies, which analyzed overtriage rates, they show that the results usually not this high, but the 
point remains. If there are hundreds of people hurt in an incident, and only enough immediate 
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resources to treat half of them, then triage is used to help sort out those who are most critically 
injured and separates those who can wait for treatment without developing serious complications 
(or dying) from their subsequent injuries. If 40% of those hundreds of patients are overtriaged, this 
puts a strain on the system, as hospitals and trauma centers would be receiving many more patients 
than are feasible for them to treat. It can then be assumed that patients, when overwhelming the 
hospitals resources, have a much greater chance for complications from their injuries.  
Another issue arising from overtriage during these incidents is how to deal with the cost of 
treating and pushing these limited resources onto those patients who do not immediately need it. 
Unfortunately, there were no overtriage literature on mass casualty incidents found. All articles 
were focused around overtriage in the emergency department, most likely as data was much easier 
to track and analyze retrospectively. As such, many of the articles found focused around 
simplifying the trauma triage system to reduce overtriage (and undertriage) as the complicated 
algorithms are the suspected cause according to the authors. Two articles found in the American 
Journal of Surgery (Lehmann, et al., 2007) (Shawhan, et al., 2015) stated and showed data to help 
reduce the cause of overtriage by simplifying the triage hospital system. However, it is important 
to note that overtriage may not only be caused by complicated triage algorithms. In the chaos and 
uncertainty of a mass casualty incident, the first responders attempting to triage the injured may 
not have trouble thinking through the algorithm, but may be under too much stress to be able to 
remember it.  
They also may be affected by what is known as overtriage bias: the desire to want to treat 
as many patients as possible and save “everyone,” thus triaging people into higher categories to 
get them treatment quicker. This bias can usually be seen in the healthcare delivery system culture 
of the U.S. With the recent passage of the Affordable Care Act and the emphasis of providing 
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insurance and healthcare for everyone, it makes sense why emergency personnel would like to 
treat all patients who are injured in a mass casualty incident immediately. Even so, it is nearly 
impossible to acquire specific reasons for overtriage in mass casualty events, as the literature is 
limited, and the data the does exists only creates speculation as to the real causes. But, it is clear 
that overtriage can be a problem during incidents and must be prevented whenever possible. One 
of the keys ways to reduce this is to focus on not overtriage patients during training exercises with 
emergency personnel. By practicing and focusing on triaging patients correctly, triage officers will 
be better prepared for when an incident does occur. 
3.2 UNDERTRIAGE 
Undertriage, being basically the opposite of overtriage, faces similar, but slightly different 
problems. Only 5% undertriage is acceptable in mass casualty events (Beach, 2010). The rate is 
much lower than undertriage for obvious reasons. If someone is undertriaged in a mass casualty 
event and does not receive the care they need to survive in time because they were classified 
incorrectly, then death is a most likely result. In the chaos of a disaster, there is always a chance 
that something like this may happen. First responders may miss an injury, not realize internal 
bleeding is occurring, or any other mistake that could cost a patient their life. 
To prevent these needless deaths, Nakahara et al. (2010), did an evaluation that established 
factors that may cause someone to slip through a well-established triage protocol. Their results 
showed much of what someone would expect: time of day, type of injury (internal/external), chaos 
of situation, number of critically injured patients, and patient characteristics (middle-aged, 
personality, conscious) all played a role in the undertriage of mass casualty events. Interestingly, 
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the factor that sticks out is the personality of the patient, and how that can affect them being 
undertriaged. If a patient was middle-aged, had an easy-going personality (shrugged off an injury), 
and was conscious, then Nakahara et al. (2010) reported that they were more likely to be 
undertriaged. It is important for emergency personnel to remember triage protocols, and to treat 
all patients they come across the same, regardless of their personality characteristics.  
In addition, in a review of trauma patients that entered emergency departments throughout 
the U.S., it was found that nearly all of those who were undertriaged were sent to non-trauma 
centers for injuries that were more severe than the hospital could handle (Holst, Perman, Capp, 
Haukoos, & Ginde, 2016). Although this report relates to hospitals, the importance remains for 
mass casualty incidents, as during the chaos of the event, paramedics and triage personnel may not 
fully be aware of a patient’s injuries fully. This could cause them to be sent to a hospital that is not 
equipped to deal with the treatment, resulting in undertriage and needless death. To reduce things 
like this from happening, flawless communication needs to occur during the incident between 
triage personnel, emergency transport personnel, and hospital officials to coordinate and transport 
those in most need to the hospitals equipped to treat the patient’s injuries fully.  
3.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF TRIAGE 
During a mass casualty event, should we save the few, or the many? The question, while 
simple, opens an entire world of controversy and debate that can be parsed out. However, only a 
short version of that will be discussed here, as an entirely new paper could be written about the 
debate revolving around the ethics of triage. The stem of the discussion revolves around deciding 
of “who gets treatment and who does not.” This same discussion can take place around disaster 
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and mass casualty incidents that involve large scale evacuations of areas. When hospitals and 
healthcare providers must evacuate patients, and there is not enough transport to take everyone at 
the same time, decisions must be made on whether to evacuate those who need less treatment 
versus those who need more treatment. These decisions are triage. In this section, I intend to 
discuss: how are those decisions made, who is responsible for making those decisions, and what 
is the reasoning behind their final decisions?  
Triage was developed around the limitations of available resources to treat all the patients 
in need of care right at that moment. Thus, in mass casualty situations, triage systems push 
resources towards those who are most in need to save the most lives, and withhold resources from 
those parties who are not likely to benefit immediately from the treatment provided (Iserson & 
Moskop, Triage in Medicine Part II: Underlying Values and Principles, 2007). As some will not 
receive treatment or resources immediately, the first question of equality arises. Ideally, everyone 
who is involved in the incident should be treated the same, and triaged accordingly. However, 
according to Tannsjo (2007), those who should receive treatment first are those we would rely on 
the most to aid in the situation: first responders, law enforcement, fire department, healthcare 
workers, public health officials, and elected officials. His opinion points towards the idea of 
utilitarianism (doing the most-good for the greatest number) is by saving those who can aid in the 
future to help remedy the situation, we can create a greater amount of “good” in the end because 
our personnel pool will have grown as the incident moves forward (Tannsjo, 2007). This thought 
process is in conjunction with the ideas of triage that were used during the two World Wars: 
treating those who can be turned back onto the field “of battle” to help achieve the goal in the 
shortest amount of time. Yet, this viewpoint conflicts with many who feel that all should be saved 
in times of mass casualty scenarios, regardless of profession, and that it should not define who 
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should receive care or treatment first. Some, like Holt (2008) argue for the idea of “virtue-based 
ethics,” which reflects the primary responsibility of physicians to provide medical care for all 
victims of such disasters. Holt claims that it is unethical to divide care of patients [in a mass 
casualty incident] based on profession, and that triage should focus on providing care for all (Holt, 
2008).  
Being equitable to all is something that must be strived for in these times of chaos and 
uncertainty. First responders do not have enough time during a mass casualty incident to interview 
each patient and identify their occupation and ability to return to the field to aid while triaging. 
Triage, as a system, recognizes that there will be times where unequal outcomes will occur, and it 
is grounded in these principals. It relies on the planning taken beforehand to establish the protocols 
and procedures in place for when incidents do occur. Yet, this does call into question the 
justification of saving one person over another. If it is reasonable to remove resources from one 
person to save another, would it also be reasonable to suggest that removing organs from someone 
who is living and replacing them into someone who is dying a reasonable action? No, it is my 
opinion that a first responder must adhere to the pre-designed triage system in place to help keep 
the results as fair as possible. This way, not only will the greatest number of lives be saved, but 
also resources will be used in the most effective manner to save those lives. 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Most triage systems are designed to serve the values of human life, human health, efficient 
use of resources, and fairness. Regardless, there is not one specific triage system that rises above 
the rest, and no protocol that is the “gold standard” above all others. There are many different types 
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of triage, and certain situations call for different analyses and use of resources on those in need. If 
faced in an emergency department during routine hours, it can be assumed that resources to treat 
all who enter will be available. However, in a mass casualty scenario, chances are more than likely 
that resources will be limited, and decisions must be made on to whom these resources will be 
applied. If training is not performed, and/or emergency personnel are not prepared for these mass 
casualty situations, problems will arise on more than one front. Therefore, it is incredibly important 
to know and understand the triage processes available, the evidence supporting each system, and 
all the ethical considerations that need considered during a crisis situation. Without this 
knowledge, it is not only hurting the triage officers, but those patients whom they are attempting 
to treat. 
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4.0  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
With the limited amount of data and evidence that is available, the decision on which triage 
system to utilize falls to the emergency responders who use it. The most common triage system 
used in the U.S. is the START system; however, just because it is the most popular does not mean 
that it is the best practice. Evidence has shown that the START system is not 100% accurate, and 
many times the accuracy is called into question when considering the training and expertise of the 
first responders using it. SALT, although based off MUCC and sponsored by the CDC grant to 
create a national standard, does not have enough evidence supporting it to show that it is more 
effective and better at triaging than the current systems that are already in place. 
It is my recommendation that the emergency personnel choose a system that they are most 
comfortable and familiar with, and train to become experts on using that triage protocol. Like was 
previously mentioned, nobody becomes an expert in performing triage overnight. It takes practice, 
trainings, and more practice before the skill sets required to adequately respond become “gut-
instincts” themselves. Whether the training is done via real-time scenarios or via virtual reality 
does not matter, as long as the organization is continually working to improve their members to be 
the best first responders possible. It is also important and recommended to discuss the ethical 
implications of triage with the members of the organization, and decide upon a rhetoric that is 
shared among all members. Having a firm foundation of belief, instead of conflicting views will 
aid the responders in their triage protocols and processes. 
It cannot be left unsaid that mistakes do occur, everyone is only human, and suffer from bias, 
indecision, stress, and many others. To address these concerns, we must fall back upon the time-
tested, continually developing, and currently developed triage decisions to keep us from interfering 
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with major ethical concerns and violating human rights in any way while performing triage. This 
paper has examined triage from beginning to current, the studies on standardization, the possibility 
of a “gold-standard,” the training techniques for the future generations, and implications that must 
be considered when discussing and utilizing triage in mass casualty events. By no means is this an 
exhaustive discussion, and more statistics and research should be done on triage before we can all 
rest comfortably on the system we have created to respond to mass casualty scenarios.  
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